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Intro duction
The classic formu la tions of the liberal notion of academic freedom in the South
African context date from the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s when the
‘Open Univer sities’1 had to define their stance in the face of the onslaught of
Verwoerdian apartheid ideology and rampant Afrikaner nation alism.
Adumbrated in the hallowed T. B. Davie formula (‘our freedom from external
inter ference in (a) who shall teach, (b) what we teach, (c) how we teach, and (d)
whom we teach’) and artic u lated more exten sively in two short books, The
Open Univer sities in South Africa (1957) and The Open Univer sities in South
Africa and Academic Freedom, 1957-1974 (1974), jointly published by the
univer sities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand, these classic formu la tions were, 
above all, concerned with a defence of academic freedom essen tially conceived 
as the insti tu tional autonomy of the university vis-à-vis possible inter ference or 
regulation by the state.2 Forty years on, it is time to revisit these classic defences 
of academic freedom from the very different vantage point of the newly
democratic South Africa. Both the external and the internal contexts of
academic freedom have radically changed. Not only has the statutory
framework of the apartheid state been dismantled and the ideological force of
Afrikaner nation alism spent but the former ‘open univer si ties’ have themselves 
been trans formed in various ways (though not in others). The relatively
small-scale collegial insti tu tions almost wholly dependent on state subsidies
are now part of a massively expanded tertiary sector subject to the
macro-politics of educa tional restruc turing as much as the domestic impact of
the managerial revolution within the university itself. In this new context
academic freedom no longer has to be defended primarily against the external
threat of state inter vention; rather it has to be defined in relation to basic
democratic norms of account ability and in the often non-collegial context of
the contem porary academic workplace.
More specif i cally this paper will be concerned with revis iting the work and
legacy of Daantjie Oosthuizen as a contri bution to the devel opment of a
‘critical tradi tion’, both at Rhodes and beyond. Oosthuizen was a product of the
Stellenbosch philo sophical tradition who had been appointed to the Chair of
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Philosophy at Rhodes in 1957. Over the next decade until his untimely death at
the early age of 43 in 1969, he wrote a number of seminal papers on key issues
of political morality and the critique of ideology. Posthu mously a selection of
these papers, edited by Ian Bunting, was published in 1973 under the title The
Ethics of Illegal Action.3 Other papers, including one on academic freedom,
were published as Occasional Publi ca tions by the Rhodes Philosophy
department in a series entitled Philo sophical Papers (the prede cessors of the
journal subse quently launched from the 1970s). Of particular relevance to our
concerns is the paper, ‘Oor Akademiese Vryheid’, written in Afrikaans and
published in Series 2 of the Philo sophical Papers,4 along with the essay ‘On
Loyalty’ in The Ethics of Illegal Action. Perhaps because they addressed the
philo sophical funda mentals rather than the political headlines Oosthuizen’s
papers were not taken up in the manifestoes issued on behalf of the liberal
univer sities at the time. From our different vantage point of a post-apartheid
democratic South Africa it may be a salutary exercise to revisit these papers in
order to ask such questions as the following:
– What do Daantjie Oosthuizen’s crit i cal anal y ses of the key is sues bear ing on
ac a demic free dom in the 1960s look like to day?
– To what extent did they con form with the clas sic lib eral defences of aca -
demic free dom artic u lated at the time?
– Did he con ceive of aca demic free dom pri mar ily in rela tion to the exter nal
threat of state inter ven tion, or to what extent did he address issues of aca -
demic free dom within the domes tic con text of the uni ver sity?
– What were the explicit or under ly ing notions of col le gi al ity, auton omy and
account abil ity involved in the artic u la tions of aca demic free dom at the time
com pared to cur rent per spec tives?
– What could be iden ti fied as the legacy of Oosthuizen with a view to the
devel op ment of a pos si ble crit i cal tra di tion in the South Afri can con text?
I will proceed, after some prelim i naries, with a close reading of the paper ‘Oor
Akademiese Vryheid’, taking in some passing refer ences to such other publi ca -
tions of Oosthuizen as may be relevant.
Prelim i naries
It may be relevant to our topic of the legacy of Daantjie Oosthuizen that, as a
student of philosophy starting out in the 1960s, I had a strong sense of his
impact on the philo sophical scene although my personal experience of, and
contacts with, Daantjie Oosthuizen actually were quite minimal. When I began
studying philosophy at Stellenbosch Daantjie had already left the campus and
only Johan Degenaar was left of the dissident trium virate – James Oglethorpe,
Daantjie Oosthuizen and Johan Degenaar – who had contributed so markedly
as graduate students to the Stellenbosch Philosophy Department over the
previous decade. In his detailed account of the Stellenbosch philo sophical
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tradition, Andrew Nash has shown how the gener ation of Oosthuizen,
Oglethorpe and Degenaar repre sented both the flowering of an intel lectual
tradition with deep local roots going back to the ‘Liber alism struggle’ in the
Dutch Reformed Church during the 1860s but also its intel lectual crisis as this
gener ation found itself unable to artic ulate a coherent response to the political
and ideological conflicts of the 1940s and 1950s.5 Quite literally Oosthuizen
consti tuted a direct link between the Stellenbosch tradition and the topic of this
Round Table, i.e. the devel opment of a Critical Tradition at Rhodes. At one
level his move to Rhodes, along with his years in Oxford in 1962 and 1968,
marked Oosthuizen’s own shift from phenom en ology and existen tialism to
analytical philosophy; more pertinent to our concerns is the way in which, at
another level, he brought to Rhodes key elements of critical thought rooted in
the Stellenbosch tradition.
As a first year student at Stellenbosch in 1957 my own induction into
philosophy was strongly shaped by two essays standardly set as core require -
ments for the first year course: one essay on Socrates, and another essay on the
nature of the university. As lecturer, Johan Degenaar of course offered a
supreme example of the Socratic mode of teaching in practice. More than the
philosophico/theological systems of Karl Heim, Arnold Loen and  Kierkegaard 
which consti tuted the official curriculum of the Stellenbosch Philosophy
Department, it was the Socratic tradition of philoso phising which had the
greatest formative impact. When as a graduate student in the early 1960s I first
encoun tered Daantjie Oosthuizen on a return visit to Stellenbosch from Rhodes 
we were all initially somewhat bemused by his trans for mation into an
‘analytical philos o pher’. But there was no problem in recog nising the familiar
kindred spirit of the philos opher as a Socratic figure, now studi ously fitted out
with a pipe, who insisted that he had no author i tative answers to impart and only 
functioned as a gadfly by questioning our assump tions and stimu lating critical
questions. I do not recall that we discussed academic freedom, the morality of
apartheid or Afrikaner nation alism at the time of this visit. But going by his
publi ca tions, these were among his core concerns at this time. As we will see
below, though, the Socratic figure will provide an important key to the under -
standing and inter pre tation of these texts and their relevance to a critical
tradition.
Framing the problem of academic freedom
While the official positions of the ‘Open Univer sities’ at the time artic u lated the 
issue of academic freedom self-evidently as a matter of defending the liberal
tradition and its core values, this is not quite the way in which Oosthuizen, for
his part, approached the problem of academic freedom in his paper ‘Oor
Akademiese Vryheid’. Instead he carefully framed his analyses of academic
freedom in a number of specific ways which require closer scrutiny. First he
specif i cally framed the entire discussion as a test case for the possi bility of
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engaging in an ‘oop gesprek’ (a term taken from Van Wyk Louw and literally
meaning an ‘open conver sa tion’). Second, he posed the issue of academic
freedom in the context of current ideological conflicts, and more specif i cally of
Marxism and Afrikaner Nation alism as against ‘Romantic’ Tradi tion alism.
(Signif i cantly this framing made no explicit reference to the Liberal tradition).
And thirdly, his more detailed analysis of the concept of academic freedom
itself was primarily concerned to establish whether, and if so in what way, this
term could make any coherent sense at all. Given the gravity of the threats to the 
univer sities posed by apartheid legis lation and security measures at the time,
this amounted to a surpris ingly defensive, even self-defeating, strategy. I will
briefly deal with the signif i cance and impli ca tions of each of these three ways
of framing the issue of academic freedom in turn.
(i) Ac a demic free dom: an ‘open con ver sa tion’?
The most basic and general way in which Oosthuizen framed his analysis of the
concept of academic freedom was in terms of the need for, and the possi bility
of, an ‘oop gesprek’about academic freedom. This was a distinctly loaded term. 
It was above all associated with the premier Afrikaans poet and intel lectual
N.P. van Wyk Louw who during the 1950s published a series of articles under
this rubric in Die Huisgenoot, later issued in book form as Liberale
Nasionalisme.6 For Louw ‘die oop gesprek’ had signified a quest for rational
and critical intel lectual debate, committed to univer salist values while
remaining grounded in Afrikaner culture and nation alism. Oosthuizen did not
share Louw’s cultural commit ments, not even in the form of ‘liberal nation -
alism’ or of ‘loyal dissent’.7 In his most extensive set of papers, published under 
the title Analyses of Nation alism in the first series of Philo sophical Papers,8
Oosthuizen provided a clinical and radically sceptical decons truction of ‘Afri -
kaans’, ‘Culture’, ‘Nationalism’and all its works. Yet he appro priated Louw’s
key term as loadstar for his own analytical and critical enter prise. What was the
signif i cance and impli ca tions of addressing the issue of academic freedom in
terms of the possi bility of an ‘open conver sa tion’?
Signif i cantly Oosthuizen did not locate his analysis of academic freedom in
the context of a particular tradition such as the liberal one, seeking to affirm it as 
a funda mental value or principle within it. On the contrary, his point of
departure was the need to escape ideological construc tions of all kinds (by
impli cation that of the liberal tradition as well). He started out by pointing to the 
fact that ‘in our country conver sa tions, more especially open conver sa tions, on
academic freedom, are a rarity’ (p.2).9 Concerns with academic freedom tended 
to be just so many ideological construc tions which only appar ently dealt with
the same subject matter but actually were solipsistic monologues talking past
each other. In actual practice discourse on academic freedom, as with other
topics, tended to consist of ‘sermons, speeches, orations, perora tions and other
forms of monologue’, (p.2) and not of an ‘open conver sa tion’ in any serious
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sense. At least two basic condi tions had to be met for a proper conver sation to
be possible on some subject: ‘people had to talk about the same matter, and their 
claims needed to be open to refuta tion’ (p.4). This was not the case with the
prevailing ideological conflicts about academic freedom where the different
parties each constructed their own self-enclosed intel lectual domains.
Oosthuizen diagnosed this pervasive intel lectual condition as one of ‘ideo -
logical schizo phrenia’ in need of ‘logical therapy’ (p.2). Moreover, within this
context there were those who claimed that all discourse was inher ently prone to
ideological conflicts of this kind, and that an open conver sation on subjects like
academic freedom was not possible. Oosthuizen took this as his basic
challenge: his primary task was to demon strate the very possi bility of an ‘open
conver sa tion’ about academic freedom, i.e. that it was possible for different
parties to engage in a discourse where refutable claims could be made regarding 
the same subject matter. He concluded the paper accord ingly: ‘I have set out to
demon strate that there are no grounds to claim that an open conver sation on
academic freedom is impos sible’ (p.22).
Compared to the prevailing artic u la tions and defences of academic freedom
by repre sen ta tives of the ‘Open Univer sities’, Oosthuizen’s analysis consti -
tuted a signif icant radical is ation of the problem. Intel lec tually and philo soph i -
cally much more was at stake than defending the insti tu tional autonomy of the
liberal univer sities against the onslaught of apartheid ideology and a security
state. The ideological challenge to the very possi bility of an ‘open conver sa -
tion’ on academic freedom involved nothing less than the prospects of any
rational and critical intel lectual culture as such. In this sense the problem of
academic freedom consti tuted a test case for  a non-ideological and rational
‘Critical Tradi tion’. In Oosthuizen’s own concluding words: ‘My attention was 
directed at the possi bility of an open, honest conver sation, rational and
progressive, about the concept of academic freedom’ (p.22).
ii) Ideo log i cal fram ing of the prob lem of ac a demic free dom
It will already be evident that Oosthuizen framed the problem of academic
freedom primarily in terms of current ideological conflicts. This will not be
surprising for a paper written in the 1960s at a time when, domes ti cally,
Afrikaner nation alism and apartheid ideology reigned supreme while inter na -
tionally the ideological conflicts of the Cold War were predom inant. However,
the precise terms in which Oosthuizen construed the ideological framing of the
problem of academic freedom are more than a little unexpected. On the one side 
he posed those ideol ogies, specif i cally Marxism and Nation alism, which
constructed the university in instru mental terms as a means to some greater end, 
be it the emanci pation of the prole tariat or the survival of the nation (pp. 1-3).
(Note that for the purposes of this argument no distinction was made between
the ideol ogies of Marxism and Nation alism). On the other side, though, we do
not find the ideology of the Liberal tradition as might have been expected in the
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circum stances. Instead, Oosthuizen charac terised the ideological counterfoil to 
the instru men talist ideol ogies of Marxism and Nation alism as ‘a tradional
university roman ticism (which) considered the university as cut off from all
ties to society, and (which) described academic freedom as complete
independence of spirit’ (p.1).
Implicitly this way of framing the problem of academic freedom amounted
to a double critique of that Liberal tradition within which the classic defences of 
academic freedom by the ‘Open Univer sities’ had been located. Not only did
Oosthuizen thereby consider the Liberal position as equally ‘ideo log ical’
compared to Marxism and Nation alism, but the substance of the Liberal
position on academic freedom was also charac terised in decidedly pejorative
terms as one of ‘Roman ti cism’. The pejorative nature of this ‘tradi tional
university roman ti cism’ was spelled out in consid erable detail and with an
unmis takable critical animus: ‘Univer sities, so it is said, have the romantic aura
of a long history. The nature of the university lies in its deeply rooted tradi -
tions... Just what that nature is can not be easily defined. It is something
mystical. It is the repre sen tation of art and culture, of schol arship and science,
of a transcen dence of the mundane and the local, something of especial quality,
compre hending the spirit of all ages and places...’ (pp.3-4). This tradi tional
university roman ticism also informed the liberal conception of academic
freedom itself: ‘Now it is just this mentality which consti tutes academic
freedom ... The precious distinc tiveness of academics must be protected.
Different laws must apply to them than to ordinary business people, mundane
politi cians or lumbering clerics. True academic freedom can only be nurtured
in the absence of any obliga tions to the state, the church and the nation’ (p.4).
As an ideological construction, this Liberal Roman ticism of academic
freedom, just as much as the ideol ogies of Marxism and Nation alism, consti -
tuted an obstacle and threat to an ‘open conver sa tion’ about academic freedom.
Two questions are raised by Oosthuizen’s charac teri sation of the liberal
position on academic freedom as an ideology of tradi tion alist roman ticism.
Firstly, can this possibly be an accurate account of Oosthuizen’s position?!
Could the Chair of Philosophy at Rhodes University in the 1960s, at the time of
Verwoerd and Vorster, really have criti cised the liberal stance of the ‘Open
Univer sities’ on academic freedom as an ideology of tradi tion alist roman -
ticism?! Surely he must have meant to target some popular or distorted version
of the liberal position on academic freedom as distinct from the basic principle
of insti tu tional autonomy. Surely Oosthuizen could not possibly have
disagreed with the substance of academic freedom, adumbrated in the T. B.
Davie formula as ‘our freedom from external inter ference in (a) who shall
teach, (b) what we teach, (c) how we teach, and (d) whom we teach’. However,
on this point the text of his paper ‘Oor Akademiese Vryheid’ was quite clear.
This was how he summa rised the ‘tradi tion alist romantic’ position on academic 
teaching:
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Tradi tion alists for their part will claim that the individual lecturer must be the sole arbiter
on what he considers as true; this means that academic freedom consists in the absence of
inter ference in the right of a lecturer to say what he wants and, if needed, to tamper with the 
illusions of the youth entrusted to his care (p.12).
There could be no doubt that it was the T.B. Davie principle of academic
freedom itself which he had in his sights in targeting the ‘tradi tion alist
romantic’ position on academic freedom. But if Oosthuizen thus unambig u -
ously cricitised the liberal principle of academic freedom as an ideology of
tradi tion alist roman ticism, then this must give rise to the second question:
What, then, was his own position on these issues? What, if anything, did he
propose as the meaning of academic freedom in place of the T.B. Davie formula 
of liberal academic freedom espoused by the ‘Open Univer sities’? I shall return 
to this issue below. For the moment we only need to note the radical impli ca -
tions of Oosthuizen’s ideological framing of the problem of academic freedom
as applied to the liberal tradition itself.
(iii) Problematising the co her ence of the con cept of ac a demic free dom
The third and perhaps most radical way in which Oosthuizen framed his
analysis of the concept of academic freedom was by problematising its signif i -
cance and coherence. This could not simply be taken for granted but needed to
be demon strated through rigorous analysis which Oosthuizen set out to do in
his paper. As a ‘stra tegic’ move in the political context of the 1960s this must
have appeared to be aston ish ingly wrong-headed. With the liberal univer sities
under direct threat of inter vention by the apartheid government of Verwoerd
and Vorster and in the face of increasing political censorship, of the bannings
and detentions of academics, of security crack downs on student movements,
etc. the response of the Chair of Philosophy at Rhodes University on the issue of 
academic freedom was that, first of all, it was necessary to demon strate the
signif i cance and coherence of this concept through rigorous analysis!
Evidently this was not primarily meant to impress the Security Police or the
ideologues of apartheid. Nor could it have been very effective as a rallying call
for beleagured academics in the ranks of the univer sities at the time. Why did
Oosthuizen find it necessary to opt for such a defensive, if not self-defeating,
‘strategy’ on the issue of academic freedom?
From his paper two answers would appear, one directly and the other more
indirectly. The direct expla nation was the extent to which discourse on
academic freedom at the time had become ideologised. As we have seen, in
Oosthuizen’s view the preva lence of ideological construc tions of academic
freedom on all sides precluded any proper conver sation on this topic: ‘Such
ideological views of academic freedom only seem to be concerned with the
same topic and are thus unable to enter into a conver sation. Attempts to reach
agreement at least on the topic to be discussed are hindered by an ideological
dialectic which make the meanings of words dependent on world views’ (p.1).
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This amounted to a patho logical condition of ‘ideo logical schizo phrenia’
which required ‘logical therapy’ (p.2). Here Oosthuizen is implicitly alluding
to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Indeed, his logical therapy for the
schizo phrenic condition of ideological discourse on academic freedom
consisted in a dose of ordinary language analysis: the way to estab lishing the
signif i cance of the concept of academic freedom consisted in analysing ‘what
we can learn from the ordinary, everyday usage of words in Afrikaans or
English’ (p.1). Presumably, though, this also committed him to the
Wittgensteinian position that in its own right philosophy could not provide any
substantive truths or principles, and that its logical therapy could at best ‘show
the fly the way out of the fly bottle’.10 This was one version of the prevailing
consensus in analytical philosophy during the 1950s and 1960s that, as a
substantive disci pline capable of discov ering truths measuring up to the criteria 
of scien tific knowledge, ‘political philosophy was dead’.11 Normative theory
could not, and should not, make any claims to author i tative insight on issues of
practical policy and morality. (It would only be during the following decades
that ‘grand theory’ would make a comeback led by Rawls’ Theory of Justice).
Faced with an urgent practical and political issue like that of academic freedom
and the plight of the open univer sities in an apartheid society, the philos opher
could not, and Oosthuizen certainly did not, make any claims to special
expertise or author i tative insight. As a possible defender of the signif i cance of
academic freedom the philos opher was the most vulnerable of champions: in
Oosthuizen’s view the philos opher had to make his case ‘in the market place’
(pp.8ff) – an implicit reference to Socrates – but in that rough and tumble he
would not be able to count on any special expertise.
It was in this self-consciously humble spirit, then, that as an ‘gnorant’ philos -
opher, i.e. one who like Socrates knows that he does not know, Oosthuizen
posed the basic problem of the signif i cance of the concept of academic
freedom. ‘The crux of the matter lies in the question: what criterion do we
utilise to determine whether we are dealing with true or fake academic
freedom? How do we know when we are dealing with the true Jacob or with
imposters? That is indeed the crucial issue’ (p.2). The way forward, he
proposed in Wittgensteinian spirit, was to apply the logical therapy of
analysing the rules of ordinary usage to the domain of academic freedom: ‘We
have to start down to earth... with the question of the market place: what do we
under stand under the term “academic freedom” in ordinary usage... The
question is what are the criteria of signif i cance in using this concept’ (pp. 8,11).
That may not have been the most effective strategy to counter the onslaught of
the apartheid state on academic freedom in the univer sities, but it was the intel -
lec tually honest place for the (Socratic) philos opher to start.
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Logical therapy: Analysing the concept of academic freedom
Having posed the problem of academic freedom not only in opposition to the
prevailing ideological construc tions, but also as a concept whose very signif i -
cance and coherence needed to be estab lished, Oosthuizen turned to his
constructive analysis of, and argument for, academic freedom. His analysis
proceeded in two stages. First, he analysed the logic of the basic concept of
freedom, and secondly he turned to the signif i cance of academic freedom by
means of an analysis of the meaning of the core academic action of ‘teaching’.
In terms of his Wittgensteinian conception of philo sophical analysis as ‘logical
therapy’, both cases focused on the rules of these terms in ordinary usage in
order to dispel the schizo phrenic hold of the prevailing ideological construc -
tions.
(i) The logic of ‘free dom’
Oosthuizen’s basic analysis of the logic of ‘freedom’ unsurprisingly followed
the standard accounts by Isaiah Berlin and others of liberty as negative
freedom.12 He rejected the essentialist conception of ‘freedom’ as naming some
typical condition or state. Freedom is a relational and contextual concept
typically expressed in terms of ‘being free from … (some obstacle or
coercion)’: ‘The expression “I am free ...” is logically incom plete. ... The
concept “feedom” is primarily a negative concept ... implying an obstacle,
coercion or obligation which has been removed’ (p.9). Signif i cantly
Oosthuizen found no reason to refer to ‘positive freedom’ in Berlin’s sense of
‘freedom to...’, except in a deriv ative sense: ‘Freedom means “to be rid of”, and
implies “so that I am now able to.”’ (p.9). The relevant point, for him, was that
in ordinary usage it made no sense to speak of freedom in general: ‘Freedom,
obstruction, coercion and obligation are relative concepts, and utterly context
deter mined in their scope’ (p.10). It followed that the standard distinc tions
between political freedom, economic freedom, personal freedom and academic 
freedom did not refer to different types of freedom each with their distinctive
properties. Instead, in all these cases ‘freedom’ had the same negative and
relational force; in each case it implied the absence of the respective obstacles,
inter fer ences or coercions applying in political, economic, personal or
academic contexts.
For Oosthuizen this first stage of the analysis estab lished two main conclu -
sions: First, it showed that in ordinary usage ‘freedom’ did have a specific
conceptual logic. There are (prescriptive) rules of usage to which we are bound
in order to make coherent sense in practical discourse. The meaning of
(academic) freedom, i.e. how we talk of ‘(academic) freedom’ in ordinary
(non-ideological) usage, is no arbitrary matter but needs to conform to the
conceptual rules of ordinary (non-ideological) usage (pp.10-11). Secondly, the
relevant question with regard to the concept of academic freedom was: ‘which
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forms of coercion, constraints, obstacles or obligation need to be removed
before certain actions or insti tu tions deserve to be charac terised as “academic”’ 
(p.11). The analysis of the relevant meaning of academic freedom thus leads on
to an analysis of such core academic actions as ‘teaching’ and ‘research’.
(ii) The sig nif i cance of (ac a demic) ‘teach ing’
With the second stage of his analysis Oosthuizen turned to the signif i cance of
the academic action of ‘teaching’, and with this we come to the heart of the
matter for his under standing of academic freedom. His analysis of the signif i -
cance of ‘teaching’ as an academic activity has a number of unexpected and
indeed provoc ative features, and will lead us on to his conception of’ ‘an open
conver sa tion’ and the nature of a possible critical tradition. To begin with,
Oosthuizen rejected the common conception that academic teaching basically
consisted in the trans ference of author i tative infor mation by lecturers to
students. Indeed, he deemed this process as amounting to indoc tri nation, using
this latter term in an objective rather than in a pejorative sense (p.11). The trans -
fer-of-information model of teaching did not go to the core of the actual
practice of academic teaching at univer sities. ‘Indeed’, according to
Oosthuizen, ‘the measure of success for a lecture in some disci plines is often
the opposite from what you would expect on this model; not that students come
with questions to a class and go away with infor mation, but that they come to
class with infor mation and go away with questions ...’ (p.12). In practice the
criteria we use to assess academic teaching did not so much apply to the truth or
falsity of the lecturer’s state ments per se, but were rather concerned with their
appro pri ateness or relevance [‘saaklikheid’], to-the-pointness [‘juistheid’] and
analytical fertility. ‘The character of lecturing in many subjects counts against
the infor ma tion-theory of academic teaching: instruction by means of formal
lectures are often, and sometimes mainly, the opposite of indoc tri nation, i.e. the 
opposite of the presen tation of “true” answers to ignorant, questioning students
by encyclo pedic, author i tative experts’ (p.13). Moreover, the trans -
fer-of-information conception of teaching played into the hands of ideological
construc tions of academic freedom: ‘Teaching would only then be considered
“academic” if the infor mation conveyed by the lecturers was “true”... But in the
human ities issues tend to become ideologised, and then not the academy, but
the nation or the prole tariat becomes the arbiter [of “truth”]’ (p.12).
How then should we under stand the meaning of academic teaching?
Ultimately, for Oosthuizen, the paradigm for academic teaching is provided by
the figure of Socrates, and we shall return to the signif i cance and impli ca tions
of the Socratic model not only for academic freedom but also for the nature of a
critical tradition. At another level, though, Oosthuizen expli cated the meaning
of academic teaching with reference to Ryle’s distinction between two kinds of
knowledge, i.e. knowing that and knowing how (pp.13-14).13 The crucial point
was that it was knowing how, the incul cation of academic and scien tific skills in
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students enabling then to engage in independent rational thinking and research,
rather than knowing that, the trans mission of ‘truths’ or author i tative infor -
mation to previ ously ignorant minds, which lay at the core of academic
teaching. Students needed to be taught how to solve intel lectual problems, how
to apply basic rules and principles, how to distin guish between relevant and
irrel evant questions or between logical and falla cious reasoning. This required
practice, while it was also the case that the effective demon stration of these
basic academic skills was not the same thing as the ability to say, at an abstract
and general level, what these academic rules actually were (p.14). In short,
Oosthuizen concluded that ‘academic teaching is primarily concerned with the
incul cation of techniques of analysis, reasoning and research... Lecturing does
not in the first place aim at the dissem i nation of “truths”... Academic teaching is 
in the first place concerned with the initi ation of students in the necessary
knowing-how skills enabling them to do independent research’ (pp. 14-15).
(iii) A dis ci pline-based con cept of ac a demic free dom
What are the impli ca tions of this analysis of the signif i cance of academic
teaching for the concept of academic freedom? Here we can return to the core
question for the meaning of ‘freedom’ in the academic context which had previ -
ously been identified as that regarding ‘which forms of coercion, constraints,
obstacles or obligation need to be removed before certain actions or insti tu tions
deserve to be charac terised as “academic”’ (p.11). More specif i cally, what
were the impli ca tions for the nature of academic freedom if teaching primarily
consisted in the incul cation of basic academic knowing how-skills? Taken
together, Oosthuizen argued, a set of basic knowing-how skills consti tuted the
nature of a particular academic disci pline: ‘The knowing how-techniques of a
particular science constitute a disci pline. The quali fi cation “academic” is
attributed to teaching or research in the first place because these actions are
based on the accep tance of a particular disci pline’ (p.15). The meaning of
academic freedom thus implicitly referred to the distinctive require ments of a
particular disci pline: ‘Accord ingly “academic freedom” refers to the absence
of those factors which would be obstructive or irrel evant to the practice of that
disci pline, and to the presence of those factors which are conducive for, and
relevant to, the conduct of that disci pline. Stupid students or inebriated
lecturers, for example, may be inhib iting to the practice of a disci pline ...’
(p.15). We may add that this analysis of the meaning of academic freedom
nicely serves to distin guish it from freedom of speech with which it is often
conflated. Academic freedom is not a matter of freedom of speech in the
particular contexts of the campus or the class room; on the contrary, academic
freedom as defined by the disci plinary constraints distinctive of academic
teaching and research will often inhibit the freedom of speech of students as
well as lecturers. Both lecturers and students are not free to say whatever they
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want in the class room or in their writing, at least if they wanted their work  to be
regarded as ‘academic’ in terms of the relevant disci plines.
A number of further impli ca tions followed from this conception of the disci -
pline as the relevant context for the meaning of academic freedom. Thus it
followed that threats to academic freedom may arise not only from external
inter vention in, or coercion of, the university but as much from internal
sources, even from academics themselves. ‘According to this measure it would
be a breach of academic freedom if an academic is obliged, or himself decides,
to assess students and lecturers by criteria which are irrel evant to the practice of
a particular disci pline. From the nature of the case criteria such as race, ethnic
origin, social standing or ideological convic tions would not be relevant here...
The only question which may be utilised as criterion for discrim i nation
consistent with academic freedom, is whether students and lecturers dispose of
the necessary abilities and are committed to strict disci plinary require ments’
(p.15, under scoring in the original). Up to a point this assertion of academic
freedom coincided with the well-known formu la tions adopted by the ‘Open
Univer sities’ in the particular context of the univer sities in apartheid society.
But only up to a point: the difference is that the disci plin ary-based conception
of academic freedom was not primarily about the insti tu tional autonomy of the
univer sities. Indeed, for Oosthuizen the insti tu tional struc tures of the university 
could well pose threats to academic freedom. Among the potential threats to
academic freedom were the university executive and even Senate itself: ‘It
would be outside the compe tence of the Rector of a university to make my
personal motiva tions for a particular research project a disci plinary matter, or
to oblige me by a Senate decision to focus my attention on a subor dinate
question within my disci plinary area, or to desist from research into a matter
considered to be outside my terrain. Senate may well make a friendly request of
academics. It’s a free country [“Vra is vry”]. But Senate does not have the
compe tence to oblige me’ (p.19, italics added). The disci plin ary-based
conception of academic freedom thus meant that, in the last instance,
academics themselves were its sole guardians. Academic freedom did not so
much mean that, free from external inter ven tions, academics should be left to
their own devices and given a licence to do and say whatever they wanted
within the protected space of the university. On the contrary, academic freedom 
only made sense within the bounds of academics’ own commitment to the
disci plinary constraints consti tutive of academic teaching and research. If
academics themselves should fail in living up to this basic commitment then
they would be respon sible for the demise of academic freedom: ‘If we
ourselves for ideological reasons do not comply with the obliga tions our disci -
plines impose on us, then we may one day discover that we have denied our
univer sities their very right to existence’ (p.21, under scoring in the original).
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(iv) (Ac a demic) loy alty and the ‘un seen uni ver sity’
The relevant historical background to this deter minedly self-critical view of the 
university and its insti tu tional struc tures and practices may well have been the
legacy of the ‘Swart affair’ at Rhodes as explained by Ian Bunting in his ‘Intro -
duc tion’ to The Ethics of Illegal Action in relation to a cognate paper by
Oosthuizen, ‘On Loyalty’. In 1962 Rhodes’s University Senate and Council
had resolved to award an honorary degree to the then State President, Mr. C.R.
Swart. When this led to a furore amongst members of staff and 26 Senate
members signed a public letter of protest disso ci ating them from the award of
this degree, they were casti gated  by senior members of the University on the
grounds of ‘disloyalty to Rhodes’.14 In his paper ‘On Loyalty’, Oosthuizen
distin guished between (contractual) fealty and loyalty proper where the latter
implicitly involved a reference to shared moral and political principles and
aims, the ‘spirit’ informing a joint enter prise rather than the formal rules. In the
case of a university loyalty would thus relate to certain ideals such as the pursuit 
of truth, standards of intel lectual integrity etc (‘On Loyalty’, pp. 33-34). The
proper locus of academic loyalty is thus the ‘unseen univer sity’ or ‘unseen body 
of scholars’, ‘of which one is at least tacitly a member by joining a university
staff or when enrolling as a student... For many people, and I may say, for many
univer sities, it is of the essence of the obliga tions of all university teachers and
students to uphold the often unspoken principles of this unseen college’ (‘On
Loyalty’, p.34, italics in the original). Thus under stood loyalty to the ‘unseen
univer sity’ may actually require academics to disas so ciate themselves in
protest from academ i cally repugnant actions by the author ities of a particular
university: ‘It is not only one’s right but one’s duty, as a member of the invisible 
college... to disas so ciate oneself from a ruling which one finds repug nant’ (‘On
Loyalty’, p.34). In short, the insti tu tional author ities even at liberal univer sities
are not neces sarily the best repos i tories for the ideals and principles of
committed academic life while academics themselves may also in practice fail
to live up to their own basic commit ments.
This analysis of the somewhat paradoxical nature of ‘academic loyalty’ was
evidently of a piece with Oosthuizen’s position on the meaning of academic
freedom. Not the insti tu tional author ities of univer sities, nor even the body of
academics themselves, can always be trusted to uphold academic freedom. In
terms of a disci pline-based conception of academic freedom they are all
accountable to the ‘unseen univer sity’ or ‘unseen body of scholars’. In that
sense Oosthuizen basically held a collegial view of academic freedom. Just
what this would mean in practical or proce dural terms is, of course, a different
matter and one to which we may return in the conclusion.
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Education, society and the state: The Socratic paradigm and the
prospects for a Critical Tradition
To complete our account of Oosthuizen’s explo ration of the meaning of
academic freedom I will turn to some enigmatic pronounce ments thrown out in
the latter parts of his paper. These concern his views, on the one hand, regarding 
the non-instrumental nature of education and, on the other, the position of
research on contract. His pronounce ments on these issues may give us some
insight into his position on the relationship between univer sities and society as
well as the state. In conjunction with some reflec tions on the signif i cance of the
Socratic paradigm this will enable us to consider the impli ca tions for the
prospects of a Critical Tradition.
(i) The non-instrumentalist na ture of (higher) ed u ca tion
Firstly, Oosthuizen’s pronounce ments on the nature of education. In the
context of his analysis of the signif i cance of academic ‘teaching’ (see above),
Oosthuizen also made some cryptic state ments regarding the nature of
university education. To begin with, he endorsed the view that the university is
not an ‘ivory tower’, and agreed that academic claims needed to take account of
practical realities (p.16). Academic teaching was only part of a more compre -
hensive process, that of higher education. However, if univer sities are
considered as insti tu tions of (higher) education then it did not follow that they
should serve some ulterior end: ‘The end of education is sometimes sought
outside education, and sometimes in the nature of education itself... The
validity of both of these views depends on a basic assumption: that it makes
sense to speak of the end of education. Both types of view presuppose that
education... may be considered as a means to an end or as an end for certain
means’ (p.16). Oosthuizen categor i cally rejected all such instru men talist
concep tions of education. Being, or becoming, an ‘educated person’ was
neither a means to some other end, nor an end in itself: ‘If education is an instru -
mental means to some end, then it must be something like a taxi cab, or even
worse, something like an individual taxi trip. And if it is an end, then it must be
something which disap pears when it has been reached’ (p.17). But, in his view,
education should not be considered as a process nor as a mental state at all;
rather, it served as a criterion of assessment: ‘Education refers to training
processes of which we approve; “being educated” refers to the possession of
certain humane skills (“menslike kundighede”)’ (p.18). This radically
non-instrumentalist conception of education may perhaps be compared to the
Humboldtian ideal of Bildung. Consider, for instance, Gadamer’s account of
the notion of Bildung in this tradition: ‘Like nature, Bildung has no goals
outside itself... In having no goals outside itself, the concept of Bildung
transcends that of the mere culti vation of given talents, from which concept it is
derived.... In Bildung ... that by which and through which one is formed
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becomes completely one’s own. To some extent every thing that is received is
absorbed, but in Bildung what is absorbed is not like a means that has lost its
function. Rather, in acquired Bildung nothing disappear, but every thing is
preserved’.15 Even so, the question remained as to what the relation of this kind
of education practised at univer sities might be to the wider society and the state, 
more especially if the university was not to be an ivory tower.
Oosthuizen did not, at least in this paper, provide any explicit or extensive
answers to this question. Perhaps one way to see what might be involved would
be to reflect on the impli ca tions of the Socratic paradigm for the relationship of
university education to society. In the context of his analysis of the signif i cance
of ‘teaching’ as an academic activity Oosthuizen raised the question whether,
or in what sense, a Socratic teacher could make his students knowl edgeable
(p.13). More generally, the question would be what kind of impact or conse -
quence a ‘Socratic’ higher education would have on society. The answer
would, of course, in large part depend on the kind of society and state involved.
In the case of an author i tarian society and/or an absolutist state ‘Socratic’ insti -
tu tions of higher education are bound to have a subversive function. The
Socratic method of teaching and education would tend to raise disturbing and
unset tling questions in young minds about religious doctrines, estab lished
social norms and political truths. This was pretty much how Oosthuizen saw the 
university in his own time, embattled as it was by ideological certainties on all
sides. But what if the external context for insti tu tions of higher education is
different, if they found themselves in an open society, amidst a pluralist culture
and in a democratic state? What would be the function and signif i cance of a
Socratic mode of higher education in a liberal democracy? That is a question
which Oosthuizen did not face, but which is very much pertinent to academic
freedom in the ‘new’ post-apartheid South Africa.
(ii) Com merce-based re search
Secondly, Oosthuizen’s remarks on the position of research on contract. In the
final pages of his paper Oosthuizen considered the differ ences between univer -
sities proper and research insti tutes run for commercial purposes. His purpose
in making this comparison was, as we have seen, to bring out the distinctive
ways in which academic activ ities such as teaching and research at univer sities
should not be subject to extra neous controls or inter ference, even those
exercised by the insti tu tional author ities of the university itself. Given this, his
remarks on the position regarding research on contract were surprising, and had 
signif icant impli ca tions. Assuming that the research done at research insti tutes
for commercial purposes measured up to strict scien tific standards, Oosthuizen
was quite prepared to allow the director of an indus trial research institute  the
powers he denied to the Rector of a University and even to the Academic
Senate, i.e. to direct and circum scribe the conduct of particular research
projects: ‘The ability to oblige [individual researchers] does not fall outside the
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compe tence of a director of an indus trial research institute. The limits of the
research, in terms of desirable as well as of permitted research, are in this case
deter mined by the needs of society, and not just by disci plinary require ments’
(p.19). In other words, in the case of research on contract this could be
considered in purely instru mental terms, as a means to an end. But then, by
impli cation, why would the same not hold in the case of the relation between the 
state and univer sities? In Oosthuizen’s view this was the basic mistake made by 
Marxist and nation alist ideol ogies: they applied the relationship which
obtained between a commercial enter prise and a commer cially-based research
institute to that which obtained between the state and univer sities. Still the
question remained: why should the same relation not hold in this case? If the
state subsi dised univer sities, should it not similarly ‘have the right to partic -
ipate in the selection of students and lecturers, and to limit or direct research on
the basis of extra-academic criteria’ (p.19)? Oosthuizen’s response came in two 
parts: first, he strongly affirmed that this just is the difference between a
university in the proper sense and a commer cially-based research institute that
the former, unlike the latter, should not be subject to direction on the basis of
extra-academic criteria. And if this is perhaps not an entirely satis factory
answer, then the second part of his response was that the issue ‘in the first place
concerned the nature of the state and only in passing touched on the nature of
the univer sity’ (p.19).
(iii) The re la tion ship be tween uni ver sity and (au thor i tar ian / dem o cratic)
state
At first sight this response by Oosthuizen might seem simply to dodge the
question whether the state does not have a right to intervene in the affairs of the
univer sities it subsi dised, and to do so on the basis of extra-academic social
goals or political policies. But on reflection his argument did raise some key
issues worth further consid er ation. In the context of an apartheid society
Oosthuizen was concerned with ideological approaches assuming an absolutist
state which allowed no independent right of existence to other insti tu tions of
civil society: ‘The argument posits an absolutist state according to which a
university, like any other insti tution, could have no claims to rights or privi -
leges against the state’ (p.20, under scoring in the original). But in such an
author i tarian or total i tarian society it followed that a university could exist, if at
all, only on the terms dictated by the state: ‘A total i tarian state of course always
has the right, or rather the power, openly to negate the right of existence of a
university by meddling with its rights and privi leges, or toying with its subsidy.
Every inter vention of this kind affect not only those rights and privi leges of the
university but its very right of existence’ (pp.20-21). This is clear and logical
enough, but Oosthuizen’s particular concern was with a more complex and
ambiguous state of affairs, that where univer sities claimed some right of
existence in the midst of an apartheid society and despite the threats of a
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would-be absolutist state. The anomalous presence of independent insti tu tions
of civil society in such circum stances must imply a very different relationship
to the state; they certainly could not owe their right of existence to the state. On
the contrary, such a right of existence would have to be achieved despite the
claims of the would-be absolutist state on them. This seems to be the force of
Oosthuizen’s cryptic state ments that ‘to say that a university has a right of
existence in society implies that univer sities must have rights and privi leges in
that society. If a university has a right of existence in a society, then it ipso facto
has the right to exercise those functions without which it could not be called a
univer sity’ (p.20, under scoring in the original). With this we are thus back with
the disci pline-based concept of academic freedom at the heart of the university.
It is a pity that Oosthuizen did not further pursue these intriguing comments
on the anomalous position of univer sities as the harbingers of an independent
civil society in the midst of the apartheid society and in relation to a would-be
absolutist state. But in so far as this is primarily an argument about the nature of
the state, and only second arily about the nature of the university, it must – at
least from our present position in a post-apartheid and democratic society –
raise some equally intriguing questions about the converse set of impli ca tions
following from the democ ra ti sation of the state. If the absolutist state could not
claim to direct the academic affairs of a university except by force of power,
since to begin with it did not recognise the univer sity’s right of existence, what
was the position in the case of a democratic state? If univer sities were subsi -
dised by a democratic state, would that democratic state not have the right to
partic ipate in the selection of students and lecturers, and to limit or direct
research on the basis of extra-academic criteria? Much would, of course,
depend on the ‘demo cratic’ character of the state. If this amounted to a formal
or proce dural political democracy only, otherwise leaving the author i tarian and 
exclusionary social struc tures in place, this would presumably not make much
of a difference to Oosthuizen’s analysis of the relationship between the state
and the university. But what if this was a democratic state and society in a more
serious sense, one marked by a strong and independent civil society, a consti tu -
tional state with a robust civil rights culture, and one where the state governed
on the basis of a proper democratic mandate? What would be the nature of the
relation between univer sities and such a democratic state? If public resources
are utilised to subsidise univer sities in such a democratic state and society,
could this be claimed as their right by univer sities – while they at the same time
refused account ability except on the basis of academic criteria? In a democratic
state committed to recog nising the right of existence of univer sities in general,
and more specif i cally to recognise academic freedom in particular, the
converse impli cation also follows, i.e. that academic freedom must be
consistent with democratic account ability. This seems to be the current charge
of Oosthuizen’s legacy: can a disci plin ary-based conception of academic
freedom be recon ciled with general notions of democratic account ability
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applied to univer sities as part of an independent civil society? What would that
amount to, both in principle and in practice?
In Conclusion
In conclusion I would like to offer some comments and assess ments from our
current perspective in a post-apartheid and democratic South Africa. My first
comment concerns Oosthuizen’s analysis of the meaning of academic freedom
in relation to the classic artic u la tions by the repre sen ta tives of the ‘Open
Univer sities’. Implicitly and effec tively, as we have seen, Oosthuizen’s
analysis amounted to a trenchant critique of this conven tional defence of
academic freedom within the liberal tradition as a ‘Romantic Tradi tion alism’.
Yet in the end the question must be raised how, or to what extent, his own disci -
pline-based conception of academic freedom, in conjunction with cognate
notions of academic loyalty to the ‘unseen univer sity’, actually differed in
substance from the ‘Romantic Tradi tion alism’ he rejected. My second
comment concerns the impli ca tions for Oosthuizen’s analysis of academic
freedom of the shift in the external context from that of ideological conflict in
an apartheid society to that of a post-apartheid and democratic state. More
specif i cally I will be concerned with the impli ca tions of his notions of a
non-instrumentalist (higher) education  in conjunction with the Socratic
paradigm for the prospects of a critical tradition in the context of a
post-apartheid and democratic society and state.
(i) A (ro man tic and tra di tion al ist) lib eral de spite him self?
My first comment concerns Oosthuizen’s relation to the liberal tradition and
the conception of academic freedom artic u lated by the ‘Open Univer sities’ at
the time. As we have seen it was a notable (and perhaps unexpected) feature of
Oosthuizen’s analysis of academic freedom that he not only did not locate his
own approach within the liberal tradition but implicitly rejected it in terms of a
‘Romantic Tradi tion alism’. Moreover and more specif i cally, not only did he
reject the ‘Open Univer sities’ concern with the insti tu tional autonomy of the
university as the core of academic freedom and instead argued for a different
disci pline-based conception of academic freedom, but he also charac terised as
‘tradi tion alist and romantic’ the position ‘that academic freedom consists in the 
absence of inter ference in the right of the lecturer to say what he wants’ (p.12),
i.e. one of the core compo nents of the T.B. Davie formula. Yet when he came to
spell out the specifics and impli ca tions of his own disci pline-based conception
of academic freedom we found that in practice these largely coincided with the
familiar formu la tions adopted by the ‘Open Univer sities’ in terms of the T.B.
Davie principles. Except for the latter’s concern with the insti tu tional
autonomy of the univer sities, Oosthuizen’s notion of academic freedom in
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practice largely coincided – though for different reasons – with the liberal
position. Where did that leave him in relation to the liberal tradition?
The vital question, of course, is how and by whom Oosthuizen’s disci -
pline-based conception of academic freedom could be given substance in
practice: if it did not amount to academic license but involved a suitable form of
academic account ability, then just what proce dures or practices did this
require? In principle it repre sented some sort of collegial notion of the
university but precisely because of Oosthuizen’s suspicion that insti tu tional
author ities could not be trusted as the guardians of academic freedom, his
position gravi tated to the notion of the ‘unseen university or ‘unseen college’
espoused in his cognate paper ‘On Loyalty’. But at this point it is hard not to
turn Oosthuizen’s pejorative casti gation of ‘tradi tional university roman ti -
cism’ against himself. How did his collegial notion of the ‘unseen univer sity’
differ from that deeply-rooted tradi tion alist conception whose nature ‘cannot
be easily defined. It is something mystical. It is the repre sen tation of art and
culture, of schol arship and science, of a transcen dence of the mundane and the
local, something of especial quality, compre hending the spirit of all ages and
places...‘ (pp.3-4)? Only if Oosthuizen could provide a tough-minded account
of the impli ca tions of his disci plin ary-based conception of academic freedom,
insisting on the specific rules and obliga tions of the basic academic skills
consti tuting a disci pline rather than any ‘mystical’ notion of colle gi ality, would 
it be possible to differ en tiate his position from that of the ‘romantic tradi tion -
alist’. In these writings he did not (yet) provide such a tough-minded account;
based on his Rylean commitment to the devel opment of ‘know ing-how’
academic skills. We may suspect that he would have been supportive of
latter-day approaches to ‘Critical Thinking’. But in the light of our recent
experience in intro ducing critical academic skills-teaching into the core
curriculum of the Human ities it is also fair to say that much more will be
required than the basic Rylean distinction between ‘knowing how’ and
‘knowing that’. In short, the impli ca tions of a disci pline-based conception of
academic freedom consistent with academic account ability still need to spelled
out in more specific terms.
(ii) A So cratic crit i cal tra di tion and the chal lenges of dem o cratic
tran si tion
Secondly I would like to consider some of the challenges and impli ca tions of
the democratic transition to a post-apartheid society for Oosthuizen’s
conception of academic freedom and of a Socratic critical tradition in higher
education. There is a sense in which Oosthuizen’s analyses of academic
freedom in the context of the apartheid state and society of the 1960s were so
profoundly oppositional in nature that he did not even begin to take on the more
constructive challenges of thinking through the function of higher education
and the role of a Socratic critical tradition in a more democratic society. This is
58 AF RICAN SO CIO LOG I CAL RE VIEW 9(1)
entirely under standable, and it would be anach ro nistic to expect that
Oosthuizen could and should have addressed our contem porary problems from
the very different vantage point of his own time. Never theless, our own current
reflec tions on the legacy of Daantjie Oosthuizen must take up this challenge. In
this regard it is relevant that, in passing, Oosthuizen several times indicated in
the course of his analyses of academic freedom and of the nature of academic
education and research that, in some sense, the more funda mental questions
concerned the character of the state and society rather than just of the university
per se. These are indica tions that Oosthuizen would have accepted that the
transition to a democratic and post-apartheid South Africa requires a
re-thinking of his concep tions of academic freedom and the nature of higher
education. Would, or could, this rethinking also require a substantial modifi -
cation in his disci pline-based conception of academic freedom and of his
non-instrumentalist conception of higher education?
In this regard it is worth pointing out that in the South African context,
certainly compared to the 1960s, the transition to a democratic and
post-apartheid society did not amount only to a radical change in the external
context of the univer sities. It is not the case that Rhodes, or other South African
univer sities of the 1960s, now find themselves confronted with a majority ANC 
government rather than the white minority rule of the Verwoerdian NP. Over
that period the univer sities themselves have also changed in as radical ways,
and not only in terms of the ‘trans for ma tion’ of their student bodies and to a
lesser extent their staffing profiles but even more so through the expansion
from small elite insti tu tions to massified insti tu tions of higher education,
through the impact of the ‘mana gerial revolu tion’ on the gover nance struc tures
of the univer sities themselves, and through a basic reori en tation in their relation 
to the market place. This is not the place to provide a proper analysis of these
profound changes in university culture and academic practice – except to ask
what their impli ca tions might be for Oosthuizen’s disci pline-based conception
of academic freedom and of his non-instrumentalist conception of higher
education. On both counts it has to be said that these notions, attractive as they
remain, are to some extent bound up with the different character of the univer -
sities of Oosthuizen’s own time. Consider what we would under stand under the
notion of academic disci plines then and now. In Oosthuizen’s case he evidently 
assumed that this idea referred primarily to the core disci plines of the Human -
ities, which in turn was the core Faculty of the University. Without saying so, he 
presumably also assumed that such disci plines were located in academic
depart ments and vested in the Chair. Given the small scale and elitist nature of
univer sities at the time this implicitly provided a fairly clear basis for definite
notions of academic disci plines. But in one way or another most of that has
changed. In the complex insti tu tions of higher education of today, where the
Human ities Faculties have been effec tively margin alised, where depart ments
increas ingly are taken up in inter dis ci plinary programmes or ‘Schools’, where
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the academic Chair and the Head of the Department more often than not has
been disas so ciated, it is no longer at all clear what the very notion of academic
disci plines entail. There are those who take all of this as so many reasons to
indulge in nostalgic reminis cences of the way things were. But there can be no
question of repli cating the small elitist univer sities of 50 years ago in current
circum stances, and I cannot think that Daantjie Oosthuizen would have wanted
that effec tively to be his legacy. That would indeed amount to a ‘romantic tradi -
tion alism’ with a vengeance! But if not nostalgia and romantic tradi tion alism,
then we need to re-think the relevance of a disci pline-based conception of
academic freedom anew in our radically changed circum stances. Oosthuizen
himself offered relatively little guide lines. It will be up to ourselves to think
through whether a disci pline-based conception of academic freedom in the
context of contem porary univer sities still make sense.
Finally we may also consider the impli ca tions of Oosthuizen’s
non-instrumentalist conception of (higher) education in conjunction with the
Socratic paradigm for the prospects of a critical tradition in the context of a
democ ra tised society and state. Would democracy make any difference to what
Oosthuizen said about the radically non-instrumentalist nature of education,
i.e. that it did not serve some ulterior end nor was it an end in itself? Perhaps not, 
and we should also not make too much of his otherwise intriguing comment that 
research on contract, unlike non-commercial research, could be subject to
extra neous inter ference and direction  for non-academic purposes. But the
continuing relevance of the Socratic paradigm raises more inter esting
questions. As we have seen, the Socratic approach was bound to have a
subversive function in the context of an author i tarian society and/or an
absolutist state by raising unset tling questions in young minds regarding estab -
lished truths. And in a democracy?! Would the difference be that in a
democracy the critical thrust of the Socratic approach in higher education
would be welcomed – and that it would thus no longer have the same general
subversive function? To the extent that freedom of thought and expression as
well as the right to opposition become insti tu tion alised in a liberal democracy it
would seem that a Socratic or ‘critical tradi tion’ would no longer have the same
basic oppositional character. This may indicate a certain domes ti cation of the
Socratic spirit and the critical tradition (Marcuse’s liberal tolerance as official
ideology?) Or would it be incumbent on the Socratic approach and critical
tradition to turn the tables precisely on these consti tutive features of a liberal
democracy? Somehow this amounts to a rather formalistic and empty reductio
ad absurdum. Similarly the alter native option, i.e. that in a democracy there
would no longer be any basic need for a critical approach, surely cannot be
taken seriously. Living in our new South African democracy we must be only
too well aware of the many and diverse challenges calling for a living critical
tradition. The problem is just that we no longer have suffi cient clarity about the
function and signif i cance of that critical tradition in our new democracy. The
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legacy of Daantjie Oosthuizen is the injunction that we should return to the
market place to redis cover the relevance of the Socratic spirit. Nor should we be 
at all surprised at the continuing need for a critical tradition even and especially
in a democracy. After all, the historical Socrates operated in the historical birth -
place of democracy itself (and consider his fate?!).
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